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Of particular interest was the agencies issue. That its relationship with its agencies somehow ceased to function productively was arguably not a problem uniquely faced by the Justice Department – this research report from a decade ago suggested a government wide issue and found that the Justice Department had the largest number of ‘non duplicate function’ agencies when compared to others, as well as the greatest variety in agency types (and one must also presume internal governance arrangements). This was outwardly reflected in the shifting names of the Department from the early 1990s – having been simply the Department for Justice from 1924-1993, it became the subject of considerable bureau-shuffling as equality, law reform, human rights and even childcare issues have come and in some cases disappeared from under its aegis, one might assume leaving their own organisational legacies. All the while, what has long seemed to be the most likely candidate for a separate agency (remember the 1985 Whitaker Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System which made a strong case for ‘a separate executive agency or board’ to manage the Prison Service?) has curiously remained firmly within the Department structure. The suggestion that a more uniform and
command-like structure for the department’s agencies might sound appealing, but
the overwhelming evidence is that trying to shoehorn agencies into – dare I say – silo-like reporting and accountability structures has not been successful anywhere. In the UK, this is formally recognised and agency management or ‘sponsorship’ is now regarded as a specialist skill for civil servants to develop.
Seeking a means to best align incentives, structures and cultures of authority in order to achieve critical tasks, especially those that cross organisational boundaries, cannot rest within the administrative system or individual departments. The Irish civil service has routinely proved itself very capable of achieving cross-organisational objectives once a political priority has been set. This report should prompt some more detailed consideration about how best the achievement of such objectives can be motivated without the need for crisis-inspired reviews.
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